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6 August 1958

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC



o k *Latest Khrushchev letters: Having failed to force the United States and Britain to accept Soviet terms for five-power summit talks, Khrushchev now hopes to use a special session of the UN General Assembly to denounce American and British actions in the Middle East before events bring about a further easing in the crisis atmosphere which Moscow seeks to maintain. Khrushchev apparently had hoped to use a five-power heads-of-government meeting to gain Western recognition of the USSR's claim to a major voice in Middle Eastern affairs; this effort appears to have been temporarily suspended. His letters contain no indication that he plans to appear before the General Assembly to present the USSR's case personally.



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II. ASIA-AFRICA

No

Jordan: The position of King Husayn's government continues to deteriorate. Should the present pro-Western government fall, action by Israel and the UAR to secure portions of Jordanian territory seems almost inevitable. The King has brought more army units into the capital to prop up local security. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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ok Pakistan: Intensive political maneuvering apparently has culminated in an agreement between President Mirza and his chief rival, former Prime Minister Suhrawardy. This should improve political stability and make it more likely that the national elections actually will be held as expected in February. The present government of Prime Minister Noon is to continue until elections. Suhrawardy would then become prime minister and support Mirza's re-election. [REDACTED]

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III. THE WEST

no Britain - Jordan: British officials show increasing anxiety over the position of British troops in Jordan, and hope that the US will continue to retain forces in Lebanon, or else send some to Jordan. Establishment of a regular supply route through Aqaba lessens the impact of Israel's banning of overflights. [REDACTED]

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ok Paraguay: The government claims it has evidence of several subversive plots, including an attempt on the life of President Stroessner. The President has ordered many arrests; and the military, which seems loyal to the regime, can probably assure the inauguration of the dictator for a second term on 15 August. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev's Demand for Special Session of the General Assembly

Khrushchev's shift in tactics in calling for a special session of the UN General Assembly in his letters of 5 August to the three Western heads of government reflects Moscow's desire for a world forum in which to denounce American and British actions in the Middle East before events bring about a further easing in the crisis atmosphere which Moscow has sought to maintain. This move represents at least a temporary suspension of Soviet efforts to exploit the divergence of views among the three Western powers on summit talks to force them to accept Soviet terms for a five-power summit meeting. The Soviet leaders apparently hoped to use such a conference to gain Western recognition of the USSR's claim to a major voice in Middle East affairs.

Khrushchev's earlier qualified acceptance of Prime Minister Macmillan's proposal for a heads-of-government meeting within the Security Council framework probably was based on the assumption that all important negotiations would be conducted in a subcommittee composed of the Big Four heads of government, plus Secretary General Hammar-skjold and possibly Prime Minister Nehru of India. Khrushchev, however, had made it clear in his letters of 28 July that he would not agree to "any ordinary session of the UN Security Council"--a device which he charged the United States and Britain were using to evade five-power talks.

Khrushchev's messages lay the groundwork for the USSR to claim credit for again having blocked an "imperialist" attempt to overthrow Arab nationalist regimes by force. He states that although the United States and Britain have rejected five-power talks, the demands of the "peoples" for summit talks forced the United States and Britain "to refrain at the present stage from expanding their aggression to other countries," particularly Iraq and the UAR.

The latest letters contain no indication that Khrushchev plans to appear before the General Assembly personally to present the Soviet case. By ending further debate on summit talks within the Security Council framework, Khrushchev's call for a General Assembly session will enable Moscow to escape the dilemma of having to sit down at the Security Council table with the Chinese Nationalist representative. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]



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Taiwan Strait Situation

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There have been no significant reflections of unusual ground force activity in the Taiwan Strait area. The launching of a direct assault against the Quemoy, where Communist strength is about equal to the Nationalist forces, would require additional troops, but these could be brought in rapidly over the Yingtan-Amoy rail line. Communist troops in the Matsu area outnumber the Nationalists by two to one, but no activity indicative of military preparations has been detected in this area.

There have been no changes in naval strength in the Fukien area.

While the activities of other forces do not reflect an intention to initiate major, hostile moves against the Chinese Nationalists, Peiping has the capability to do so at any time. A recently renewed flurry of propaganda urging Taiwan's "liberation" appears to have subsided since Khrushchev's recent trip to Peiping, but the Chinese Communists have professed concern that the Nationalists are planning military action against the mainland.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Deterioration of Jordanian Monarchy

King Husayn is continuing efforts to shore up the monarchy by gathering around the throne as many "loyal" political leaders as possible. He has attempted to strengthen his position in the capital by moving additional army units to Amman, [REDACTED]

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The new court minister, Hazza Majali, is concerning himself with matters of policy normally outside the prerogatives of his position. The new minister's initiative probably reflects his aspirations for the role of prime minister, in view of the deteriorating health of Prime Minister Samir Rifai. Majali has suggested that the government release many individuals under detention, and he may envisage for himself the role of a transition prime minister who would attempt to bring Jordanian policies into line with Nasir's.

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Syria's closure of its border with Jordan on 3 August completes the effective isolation of Jordan, except via the Gulf of Aqaba route. Increased prices as a result of interruption of imports will almost certainly stimulate further the rising public dissatisfaction with the government. The loss of imports from Syria and of the normal export markets

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
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in Iraq confronts Jordanian businessmen with the necessity of reaching some sort of accommodation with the UAR.



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In this situation the monarchy is seen by an increasing number of Jordanians as the main obstacle to reaching a political accommodation with Jordan's UAR-oriented neighbors.



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Pakistani Leaders Make Election Pact

An agreement of 3 August between Pakistan's President Mirza and his chief rival, former Prime Minister Suhrawardy, should bring at least temporary improvement in political stability and make it more likely that the national elections will be held as expected in February. The two leaders apparently agreed to campaign for the election of national and provincial assemblies which would elect Mirza as president. Mirza would then name Suhrawardy as prime minister of a Republican party - Awami League coalition. Suhrawardy promised to continue to support the present government of Prime Minister Noon until the elections under the condition that an Awami League government be restored in East Pakistan when the current period of President's Rule there expires on 24 August.

The Mirza-Suhrawardy pact is the culmination of intensive political maneuvering which began immediately after Mirza's return to Karachi on 22 July from his Baghdad Pact talks in Ankara and Tehran. The President's apparent willingness to cooperate again with Suhrawardy, whose influence he had sought to eliminate ever since ousting him from office last October, probably results from his reaction to recent developments in the Middle East and within Pakistan. The fate of his allies in Baghdad may have shaken Mirza sufficiently to cause him to reappraise his own position.

In Pakistan, the sharp rise in public criticism of the government's pro-Western foreign policy, of which Suhrawardy is a strong supporter, and the decline in Mirza's support among the military and other key groups probably also influenced his thinking. Mirza's recent protestations that he is "turning over a new leaf" and intends to be a "constitutional president" from now on should, however, be accepted with reserve. Moreover, as a purely political accommodation, the Mirza-Suhrawardy deal is subject to changing political conditions.

III. THE WEST

British Policy Toward Jordan

British officials are showing increasing anxiety over the position of British forces in Jordan. London hopes United States forces will remain in Lebanon on almost any pretext or else be sent to Jordan, partly to avert charges of resurgent British imperialism. The British Embassy in Amman believes that developments in the next 30 to 60 days probably will determine Jordan's future. It is convinced that Jordan cannot maintain itself without continuing foreign military aid.

British diplomatic and military officials are speaking openly of retaining troops there until winter. Since Nasir has so far allowed British supply ships to transit the Suez Canal for Aqaba, and the flow of supplies through Aqaba is established, the impact of Israel's refusal to permit further overflights is mitigated. A 39-day supply of POL and troop maintenance supplies for 24 days were available on 29 July.

[REDACTED]
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Apparently London is now considering promoting some type of UN trusteeship status for Jordan or a major power guarantee of independence. Foreign Secretary Lloyd would evidently like the UN to take over Britain's stated mission of preserving Jordan's integrity.

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[REDACTED]
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Approach of Inauguration Stimulates Plotting In Paraguay

Renewed plotting by Paraguayan exiles of all opposition parties and by some members of the ruling Colorado party apparently has its roots in government moves to liberalize political conditions prior to President Stroessner's second inauguration on 15 August. Communists who are active among the exiles reportedly are trying to further the plotting by coordinating the activities of the various groups.

Political liberalization is opposed both by some Colorados who fear it would reduce their special privileges and by members of the radical opposition because it would dissipate some of the discontent on which they base their plans.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Stroessner told the US army attaché on 3 August he expects in the immediate future an attempt on his life and that of Colorado party leader Tomas Romero Perreira. While the government is confident that the situation is under control, Stroessner has ordered the arrest of a number of military officers. Stroessner, however, probably retains sufficient military support to weather the crisis.

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